Legal Recognition of Male Victims of Domestic and Sexual Violence:
Challenges to Gender Justice in India
Asha Rani1*, Dr. Dashrath Singh Shekhawat2
[1]
Research Scholar, Faculty of Law, Maharishi Arvind University, Jaipur,
Rajasthan, India
asharohtash@gmail.com
2 Supervisor, Faculty of Law, Maharishi
Arvind University, Jaipur, Rajasthan, India
Abstract: Gender
justice is conventionally associated with the protection and advancement of
women because women have historically experienced structural discrimination,
economic dependency, domestic abuse, sexual violence, and social exclusion on a
disproportionate scale. The development of women-specific legislation in India
has therefore been an essential component of substantive equality. However,
gender justice in a contemporary constitutional democracy also requires
recognition that victimhood is not biologically exclusive. Men may experience
physical, emotional, economic, psychological, and sexual violence within
intimate and domestic relationships, yet Indian law provides them with
comparatively limited specialised remedies. The Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 defines an “aggrieved person” specifically as a woman,
thereby excluding adult male victims from its specialised protection-order,
residence, monetary-relief, and related mechanisms. Similarly, Section 63 of
the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 defines rape through a male perpetrator and a
female victim. The BNS, which came into force on 1 July 2024, also omitted the
former Section 377 IPC framework. Before enactment, the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Home Affairs specifically observed that this omission would create
a gap concerning non-consensual sexual acts against men and transgender persons
and recommended legislative inclusion of an appropriate provision.
This article examines the legal recognition of male victims of domestic
and sexual violence in India through constitutional, socio-legal, and
comparative perspectives. It does not argue that violence is gender-symmetrical
or that women-specific protections should simply be removed. National Indian
data continue to demonstrate the serious prevalence of violence against women;
approximately 29 per cent of ever-married women aged 18–49 reported physical or
sexual violence by a husband in NFHS-5. At the same time, smaller empirical
studies indicate that male victimisation exists and remains under-researched. A
community-based study of 1,000 married men in Haryana reported substantial
experiences of emotional and other forms of partner violence, while
simultaneously observing that gender symmetry did not exist regarding physical
violence.
Drawing comparative lessons from the United States and United Kingdom,
the article proposes an approach of inclusive substantive gender justice:
gender-neutral access to basic legal protection combined with gender-responsive
policies addressing the particular vulnerabilities experienced by women. Legal
reform should be based upon harm, absence of consent, coercion, vulnerability,
and abuse of power rather than rigid presumptions regarding the sex of either
victim or perpetrator.
Keywords: Male
Victims; Gender Justice; Domestic Violence; Sexual Violence; Gender-Neutral
Laws; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita; Domestic Abuse; Sexual Assault; Gender Bias;
Equality; Men’s Rights; Victimology; Human Rights; Intimate Partner Violence;
India.
INTRODUCTION
Gender justice is one of the
essential dimensions of equality, dignity, liberty, and human rights.
Traditionally, both international human-rights law and domestic legal reform
concentrated primarily upon discrimination and violence against women. This emphasis
was historically justified. Patriarchal family structures, unequal property
rights, economic dependence, restricted participation in public institutions,
dowry practices, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence placed women in
positions of systemic disadvantage. Consequently, many of the most important
legal reforms in India have been enacted specifically to protect women.
The Constitution of India
provides the normative foundation for these protective measures. Article 14
guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws. Article 15(1)
prohibits discrimination on grounds including sex, while Article 15(3) expressly
permits the State to make special provisions for women and children. The
constitutional design therefore recognises that equality does not necessarily
require identical treatment. Substantive equality may require special measures
to remedy historical and structural disadvantage.
The difficulty arises when
protective legislation is interpreted as establishing an absolute proposition
that only members of one gender can be victims of particular forms of violence.
Contemporary research on intimate partner violence, developments in victimology,
evolving notions of gender identity, and international comparative law
demonstrate that domestic and sexual violence may also be experienced by men
and gender-diverse persons. Recognition of this fact does not reduce the
seriousness of violence against women. Rather, it raises an additional
question: whether the right to legal protection should depend exclusively upon
the sex of the victim.
Indian law provides an
important illustration of this dilemma. The Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 was enacted to provide effective protection to women facing
violence within the family. It recognises physical, sexual, verbal, emotional,
and economic abuse and creates important civil and quasi-civil remedies. Yet
Section 2(a) defines an “aggrieved person” as a woman who is or has been in a
domestic relationship with the respondent. Therefore, a similarly situated
adult man subjected to serious domestic abuse cannot seek relief as an
aggrieved person under this Act.
The gendered structure is
even more evident in sexual-offence law. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 provides that a “man” commits rape when specified penetrative
acts are committed against a “woman” under circumstances including absence of
consent. Men may consequently be victims of physical offences under general
criminal provisions, but the statutory offence of rape does not recognise an
adult male as a rape victim.
The position became
particularly significant when the BNS replaced the Indian Penal Code on 1st
July 2024. The earlier Section 377 IPC,1860 had historically criminalised
so-called “carnal intercourse against the order of nature.” In Navtej Singh
Johar v. Union of India, the Supreme Court invalidated its application to
consensual sexual conduct between adults, but non-consensual acts continued to
remain punishable. When the BNS omitted Section 377 without introducing an
equivalent gender-neutral offence, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home
Affairs specifically warned that there would be no corresponding provision
dealing with non-consensual sexual offences against men and transgender persons
and recommended retaining an appropriate provision. The recommendation was not
incorporated into the final BNS,2023.
Domestic and sexual violence
against men must nevertheless be approached cautiously. The argument for male
victim recognition should not rely upon unsupported claims that men and women
experience violence in identical proportions, contexts, or severity. NFHS-5
records that approximately 29 per cent of ever-married Indian women aged 18–49
years have experienced physical or sexual spousal violence. Furthermore,
national domestic-violence data collection in India has concentrated
substantially upon women, leaving comparatively little nationwide evidence
regarding men.
A 2019 community-based study
by Malik and Nadda involving 1,000 married men aged 21–49 in rural Haryana
provides one of the frequently cited empirical examinations of male
victimisation. The study reported that 51.5 per cent of respondents had
experienced some form of violence from a wife or intimate partner at least once
during their lifetime, with emotional violence forming the largest component
and physical violence reported by approximately 6 per cent. Importantly, the
researchers also noted bidirectional violence in some relationships and
expressly concluded that gender symmetry did not exist regarding physical
violence. These limitations demonstrate why a single regional study cannot be
extrapolated to all Indian men. It nevertheless establishes an important
proposition: male victimisation exists and deserves systematic empirical
investigation.
The central argument of this
article is therefore neither anti-woman nor based upon an assumption of
symmetrical victimisation. It proposes that contemporary gender justice
requires two simultaneous commitments. First, India must maintain and
strengthen effective measures against structural violence and discrimination
suffered by women. Second, it should ensure that men and other persons who
suffer comparable forms of abuse are not rendered legally invisible merely
because they do not conform to conventional assumptions about victimhood.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historical development
of domestic and sexual-violence legislation is closely connected with changing
concepts of family, marriage, masculinity, femininity, consent, and individual
autonomy. In traditional patriarchal societies, the family was frequently
treated as a private institution into which law should intervene only
reluctantly. Authority within the household was commonly associated with men,
while women were expected to occupy dependent domestic roles. Such arrangements
contributed to the normalisation of violence against women and delayed
recognition of domestic abuse as a legal and human-rights problem. At the same
time, patriarchal ideas created a second stereotype: because men were expected
to be physically powerful, emotionally resilient, economically dominant, and
authoritative within families, the possibility of male victimisation was rarely
acknowledged.
The history of
gender-specific protection in India must therefore be understood against
genuine inequalities affecting women. During the nineteenth century, legal and
social reform movements challenged practices concerning child marriage,
widowhood, inheritance, women's education, and family status. Colonial criminal
law reflected contemporary Victorian attitudes toward sexuality and gender. The
Indian Penal Code, 1860 defined rape in a male-perpetrator/female-victim
framework. Family and matrimonial relations similarly operated through gendered
assumptions.
After independence, the
Constitution of India introduced equality as a foundational principle. Articles
14 and 15 transformed the legal status of women by recognising equal
citizenship while simultaneously permitting special provisions for women and
children under Article 15(3). This combination was significant. The framers did
not consider equality to mean merely identical treatment; they recognised the
legitimacy of remedial measures addressing historically unequal circumstances.
International law followed a
similar development. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 affirmed
equality in dignity and rights. CEDAW, adopted in 1979, later required States
to eliminate discrimination against women across political, economic, social,
cultural, and family life. The women's-rights movement increasingly
demonstrated that violence within intimate relationships was not a purely
private issue but a violation of dignity, bodily integrity, and equality.
Indian criminal law began
responding more systematically to matrimonial violence during the 1980s.
Section 498A was inserted into the IPC in 1983 to criminalise cruelty by a
husband or his relatives against a married woman. It responded particularly to
dowry-related harassment and severe abuse. The provision represented an
important transformation in legal consciousness because conduct occurring
inside marriage was recognised as capable of generating criminal
responsibility.
The development of
gender-justice jurisprudence continued during the 1990s. Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan in 1997 recognised workplace sexual harassment as violating
women's fundamental rights and established judicial guidelines before
Parliament enacted specific legislation. The judgment demonstrated that gender
violence could affect equality in employment, occupational freedom, and dignity
as well as physical security.
The Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 constituted one of India's most comprehensive
responses to violence within families. The statute deliberately moved beyond
physical assault and recognised sexual, verbal, emotional, and economic abuse.
Its significance cannot be underestimated. Women experiencing domestic abuse
obtained access to protection orders, residence-related remedies, monetary
relief, custody-related measures, and compensation without having to depend
exclusively upon ordinary criminal prosecution.
However, the statute
institutionalised a gender-specific conception of victimhood. An adult male
subjected to domestic violence cannot be an “aggrieved person” under Section
2(a). This distinction reflected the legislative priority of addressing
widespread violence against women, but it has become increasingly important as
understanding of intimate partner violence has expanded.
The global development of
victimology also challenged assumptions that masculinity eliminates
vulnerability. Studies in different jurisdictions began documenting physical
abuse, psychological coercion, economic control, stalking, sexual
victimisation, and coercive relationships experienced by men. Researchers
simultaneously warned against simplistic statistical comparisons because the
frequency, severity, consequences, and social context of intimate partner
violence often differ by gender.
India's response to sexual
offences underwent major transformation after the 2012 Delhi gang-rape case.
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 expanded the definition of rape and
created or strengthened offences involving stalking, voyeurism, disrobing, and
sexual harassment. Yet the adult rape framework remained gender-specific.
During this period, Parliament had already enacted the Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. POCSO is significant for the present discussion
because its protection of children is not dependent upon whether the child is
male or female. Thus, Indian law already demonstrates that sexual-offence
protection can be victim-neutral in an appropriate statutory context.
Constitutional jurisprudence
subsequently moved toward a stronger rejection of gender stereotypes. In National
Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014), the Supreme Court
recognised the constitutional rights and gender identity of transgender
persons. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) affirmed dignity,
privacy, sexuality, and autonomy while decriminalising consensual same-sex
relations between adults. Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018)
invalidated the adultery offence under Section 497 IPC and rejected the
patriarchal notion of women as the property of husbands.
These decisions have broader
implications beyond the particular provisions they invalidated. They
demonstrate that constitutional adjudication increasingly evaluates legislation
not only according to whom it intends to protect but also according to whether
it perpetuates stereotypes about the appropriate behaviour, sexuality,
dependence, or social roles of men and women.
The legal debate entered a
new phase with the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Although the BNS replaced the
colonial IPC, several sexual offences retained their gender-specific structure.
Chapter V itself is titled “Of Offences Against Woman and Child,” and Sections
63–79 contain a number of offences formulated specifically around female
victims. Section 85 similarly continues criminal liability for cruelty by the
husband or relatives of the husband toward a woman.
Simultaneously, Section 377
IPC disappeared. The Parliamentary Standing Committee examining the BNS
explicitly considered this issue. It acknowledged the constitutional
correctness of decriminalising consensual adult same-sex relations but observed
that Section 377 had continued to cover certain non-consensual sexual conduct.
The Committee therefore recommended restoring a provision capable of addressing
non-consensual sexual offences against men and transgender persons.
Historically, therefore,
Indian gender law has moved through several stages: from non-intervention in
family violence, to recognition of women's structural vulnerability, to strong
women-specific protection, and finally toward emerging questions of inclusive
victimhood. The contemporary challenge is not whether the achievements of
women's rights should be reversed. It is whether the next stage of gender
justice can protect women effectively while recognising that violence is
fundamentally an abuse of another human being and may sometimes cross
conventional gender boundaries.
UNDERSTANDING MALE VICTIMISATION AS A GENDER-JUSTICE ISSUE
The legal recognition of
male victims requires conceptual clarity. “Gender justice” does not mean that
every gender experience identical social conditions. Nor does gender neutrality
require lawmakers to ignore evidence demonstrating that women may face
particular kinds of violence at higher rates or with more severe consequences.
The concept of substantive
equality is therefore preferable to mechanical neutrality. Substantive
equality recognises differences in social vulnerability but insists that legal
classifications must serve legitimate objectives without unnecessarily
excluding similarly situated victims.
Male victimisation may
involve physical assault, threats, humiliation, financial control, coercive
isolation, destruction of property, reputational abuse, false threats,
stalking, coercive sexual conduct, and psychological domination. Some abusive
relationships may also involve bidirectional aggression. Each category requires
careful investigation rather than a presumption that the person reporting abuse
must be either victim or perpetrator because of sex.
Masculine stereotypes
constitute a serious barrier to reporting. A man who reports violence by a
female partner may fear ridicule or assumptions that he should have physically
resisted. Men experiencing abuse by male partners may additionally face stigma
associated with sexuality. Emotional and psychological abuse may be dismissed
because injury is not physically visible.
Such stereotypes demonstrate
that patriarchy can disadvantage different people in different ways. The
patriarchal expectation that women must be submissive contributes to violence
against women; the expectation that men must always be strong can make male
victimisation socially unintelligible. Challenging the latter does not deny the
former.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL POSITION OF MALE VICTIMS IN INDIA
The Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 represents a highly developed protective mechanism
but is expressly designed for women. Section 2(a) limits the status of an
aggrieved person to a woman. A male victim therefore cannot directly obtain the
range of remedies available under the statute in his own capacity as an
aggrieved person.
These remedies are
significant. Domestic abuse frequently requires more than prosecution after an
offence has occurred. A victim may urgently require an order preventing
contact, protection from threats, temporary residence arrangements, financial
relief, counselling, or institutional assistance. The absence of an equivalent
male-specific or gender-neutral civil protection framework creates a
substantive difference between victims experiencing otherwise comparable forms
of harm.
This does not mean that
abused men possess no legal remedies whatsoever. Depending upon the facts,
general provisions concerning hurt, criminal force, intimidation, wrongful
confinement, property offences, or other misconduct may apply. Matrimonial law
may also provide divorce or other civil remedies. The problem is that these
remedies do not necessarily replicate the integrated protective structure of
the Domestic Violence Act.
The Supreme Court's decision
in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016) is relevant to
the evolution of the Act. The Court invalidated words restricting the
“respondent” to an “adult male.” As a result, women can also be proceeded
against as respondents under the legislation in appropriate cases. Yet the
person claiming statutory protection continues to be a woman. The legal
framework can therefore recognise a female perpetrator but not an adult male
beneficiary.
This creates an interesting
doctrinal position. If the objective of domestic-violence law is ultimately to
prevent abuse arising from domestic relationships, the gender of the victim may
not always be essential to the nature of the misconduct. At the same time, the
social context explaining why women require specialised protection remains
powerful. The answer need not therefore be repeal of the existing scheme.
One possible approach is to
redesign the legislation around a gender-inclusive definition of “aggrieved
person” while preserving targeted services for women. Shelters for abused
women, maternity-related support, services for women facing dowry violence, and
specialised programmes for women in economically vulnerable circumstances can
continue. Gender-neutral eligibility for a protection order does not logically
require identical service design for every category of victim.
The United States provides a
useful illustration of this distinction. The federal framework associated with
the Violence Against Women Act expressly prevents male victims from being
excluded from benefits and prohibits discrimination in funded programmes on
grounds including sex and gender identity. It nevertheless permits sex-specific
programming when necessary, provided comparable services are made available.
This model separates the right to recognition from the design of specialised
services.
India could adopt a similar
principle: universal access to basic legal protection combined with
differentiated support according to demonstrated need.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST MEN AND THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA
The legal position of adult
male victims of sexual violence raises an even more fundamental issue because
sexual assault affects bodily integrity, sexual autonomy, dignity, and privacy.
Section 63 BNS defines rape
through specified acts performed by a man upon a woman. The statutory
formulation therefore recognises a female victim but does not recognise an
adult male as the victim of rape.
The gender-specific
structure should be distinguished from the question of whether women experience
rape disproportionately. The prevalence of sexual violence against women
remains an urgent problem, and strong protections are indispensable. But
frequency and legal recognition answer different questions. Even where one
group constitutes a majority of victims, the existence of minority-category
victims may still justify legal protection.
Prior to the BNS, Section
377 IPC provided at least a criminal-law route for certain forms of
non-consensual sexual penetration involving male victims. Navtej Singh Johar
did not invalidate the provision insofar as it concerned non-consensual
conduct. Its constitutional objection concerned the criminalisation of
consensual adult same-sex intimacy.
The BNS subsequently omitted
Section 377 altogether. The Parliamentary Standing Committee expressly
identified the resulting problem and recommended inclusion of protection
against non-consensual sexual offences affecting men and transgender persons.
PRS Legislative Research similarly identified the omission as creating a
significant gap concerning forced sexual conduct against adult men.
This gap demonstrates why
legal reform should not simply revive the moralistic language of the historical
Section 377. The constitutionally appropriate response would be to enact a
modern, consent-based, gender-inclusive sexual-assault provision. The relevant
question should be whether sexual penetration, touching, coercion, or another
specified sexual act occurred without legally valid consent, not whether the
victim belongs to a predetermined sex.
Indian lawmakers already
possess a domestic example. POCSO protects children from sexual offences
irrespective of whether the child is male or female. There is therefore no
doctrinal impossibility in constructing victim-neutral sexual-offence
legislation.
A carefully designed
framework could preserve rape provisions recognising the specific social
reality of violence against women while simultaneously creating equivalent
offences protecting male and transgender victims. A more ambitious reform could
gradually reorganise sexual offences into gender-neutral, consent-based
categories with sentencing aggravations addressing particular vulnerability.
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS: ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 21
The debate concerning male
victims must be situated within constitutional equality rather than reduced to
political competition between men and women.
Article 14 guarantees
equality before law and equal protection of laws. Classification based upon
gender is not automatically unconstitutional, particularly where it addresses
historical inequality. Article 15(3) expressly permits special provisions for women
and children.
Women-specific laws
therefore possess a strong constitutional foundation. However, Article 15(3)
should be understood as an enabling provision rather than a constitutional
command that protection available to women must necessarily be denied to men.
A useful distinction exists
between special advantage and basic protection from violence. Maternity
benefits, reservations, women-only facilities, or targeted welfare schemes may
legitimately respond to circumstances particular to women. Protection against
physical violence, forced sexual activity, coercive control, and serious
psychological abuse concerns fundamental bodily and personal integrity. The
case for excluding victims solely because they are male is consequently less
self-evident.
Article 21 strengthens this
argument. The Supreme Court has interpreted life and personal liberty to
include dignity, privacy, bodily integrity, autonomy, and decisional freedom.
These values are human rather than sex-specific.
Anuj Garg v. Hotel
Association of India demonstrated the Court's increasing suspicion of gender classifications
based upon paternalistic stereotypes. NALSA expanded constitutional
understanding beyond binary gender categories. Navtej Singh Johar
emphasised autonomy and constitutional morality, while Joseph Shine
rejected legal rules grounded in stereotypical conceptions of marital gender
roles.
Read together, these
decisions indicate that gender classifications should increasingly be justified
through evidence and constitutional purpose rather than inherited assumptions.
The constitutional argument
for male victim recognition therefore need not challenge Article 15(3). India
can continue to adopt special provisions for women while creating baseline
gender-neutral rights to protection from domestic and sexual violence.
MISUSE OF PROTECTIVE LAWS AND THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
The debate concerning male
victims is frequently linked with allegations of misuse of matrimonial laws,
particularly provisions dealing with cruelty. This aspect requires considerable
caution.
Section 85 BNS continues the
offence of cruelty by a husband or relative of the husband toward a woman and
provides imprisonment extending to three years and fine. The provision
addresses a genuine problem of matrimonial abuse and dowry-related harassment.
At the same time, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged concerns regarding unnecessary arrest. In Arnesh
Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014), the Court emphasised that arrest should not
automatically follow merely from an allegation and required police to apply the
statutory criteria governing necessity of arrest.
The principle emerging from Arnesh
Kumar is more constructive than polarised arguments either demanding repeal
of protective legislation or presuming every complaint to be true. Victim
protection and due process are mutually reinforcing components of a legitimate
justice system.
A gender-just system must
therefore satisfy four principles: genuine allegations must be taken seriously;
investigation must remain impartial; arrest must satisfy legal necessity; and
intentionally fabricated complaints, where independently proved, should attract
consequences under ordinary law.
Male victim recognition
should not be built upon the presumption that women misuse law. Such a premise
itself replaces one gender stereotype with another. The stronger case for
reform is affirmative: any person subjected to serious domestic or sexual violence
deserves access to appropriate legal remedies.
SOCIO-CULTURAL BARRIERS FACED BY MALE VICTIMS
Legal exclusion is only one
dimension of male victimisation. Social norms can discourage men from
identifying themselves as victims even where ordinary criminal remedies
technically exist.
Masculinity is frequently
associated with strength, independence, emotional control, and physical
dominance. A man who experiences domestic abuse may therefore interpret
disclosure as an admission of personal failure. Friends, relatives, police
officers, or even professionals may respond with disbelief or humour rather
than support.
Economic abuse against men
can also be overlooked because men are socially expected to be primary earners.
Emotional abuse may be dismissed as normal marital conflict. Threats involving
children, reputational damage, isolation from family, or coercive control may
not fit conventional images of domestic violence.
Sexual victimisation creates
still greater barriers. Men may experience involuntary physiological responses
during assault, which can wrongly be interpreted as evidence of consent. Fear
of being labelled weak, homosexual, or insufficiently masculine may further
reduce reporting.
Male victims in same-sex
relationships may face multiple disadvantages involving sexual-orientation
stigma and limited awareness of services. Transgender men and gender-diverse
victims confront additional legal and institutional difficulties.
The result is a cycle of
invisibility. Low reporting produces limited official data; limited data is
then used to justify the absence of specialised services; the absence of
services further discourages reporting.
National research is
therefore essential. India's major domestic-violence survey architecture has
historically concentrated on women's experiences. NFHS-5's domestic-violence
module was administered to selected women aged 18–49 rather than creating directly
comparable nationwide victimisation measures for adult men. Consequently, the
absence of national male prevalence figures cannot safely be interpreted as
evidence of absence of victimisation.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE NEED FOR CAUTION
The Haryana study by Malik
and Nadda is significant because it directly investigated gender-based violence
experienced by married men. Among 1,000 participants, 51.5 per cent reported
having experienced some form of violence by a wife or intimate partner at least
once, while 10.5 per cent reported such experience during the preceding twelve
months. Emotional violence formed by far the largest component, while physical
violence was considerably less prevalent.
These figures should not be
misrepresented. The study was geographically limited, focused upon married men
aged 21–49, included emotional violence within its broader measure, and
reported evidence of bidirectional violence. Its authors specifically stated
that gender symmetry did not exist for physical violence in India.
Accordingly, the study
cannot establish that men experience domestic violence at the same rate or
severity as women nationally. Its appropriate significance is narrower but
important: male victimisation is empirically observable and deserves larger
representative research.
This is consistent with
international evidence. United States CDC data indicate that approximately 41
per cent of women and 26 per cent of men reported lifetime contact sexual
violence, physical violence, or stalking by an intimate partner accompanied by
a related impact. The CDC also reports very large numbers of both women and men
experiencing psychological aggression by intimate partners. These statistics
simultaneously establish two propositions: women experience a greater measured
burden in the composite severe-impact indicator, but substantial male
victimisation exists.
Gender justice therefore
requires empirical differentiation rather than ideological simplification.
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
United States of America: The United States provides an instructive model because its
domestic-violence framework recognises the historically gendered nature of
intimate partner violence while increasingly providing services without
sex-based exclusion.
The Violence Against Women
Act was enacted in 1994 in response to serious concerns regarding domestic
violence, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking. Despite its
women-focused title and origins, the contemporary statutory framework expressly
states that male victims are not prohibited from receiving benefits and
services.
Federal law further
prohibits discrimination in VAWA-funded programmes on grounds including sex,
gender identity, and sexual orientation. Where sex-specific programming is
necessary, comparable services must be made available to persons who cannot
participate in that programme.
The U.S. Department of
Justice Office on Violence Against Women currently describes domestic violence
as a pattern of abusive behaviour used by one partner to gain or maintain power
and control over another intimate partner. Its public guidance expressly
recognises that domestic violence can occur regardless of sex or gender
identity and in both opposite-sex and same-sex relationships.
This model contains an
important lesson for India. Naming women as a group disproportionately affected
by gender violence does not require excluding men from services.
American data collection
also illustrates the value of surveying both sexes. CDC's National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey identifies significant victimisation among
both women and men, permitting policy to distinguish prevalence while recognising
all victims.
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom provides another useful comparison because it has
adopted substantially gender-neutral domestic-abuse legislation.
The Domestic Abuse Act 2021
defines abusive behaviour through the relationship and conduct involved rather
than the sex of the victim. Abuse includes physical or sexual abuse, violent or
threatening behaviour, controlling or coercive behaviour, economic abuse, and
psychological or emotional abuse. The persons involved must be “personally
connected,” a category covering current or former spouses, civil partners,
intimate partners, parents of the same child, and relatives.
Importantly, the UK's
gender-neutral statute exists alongside government recognition that domestic
abuse and related offences disproportionately affect women. Gender-neutral
protection has therefore not required abandonment of violence-against-women
policy.
The UK Government's Supporting
Male Victims position statement, updated in 2022, expressly recognises male
victims of crimes situated within its broader violence-against-women-and-girls
policy framework. It is intended to identify specific challenges faced by male
victims, improve access to services, and encourage appropriate institutional
responses.
The existence of demand for
such services is measurable. Official statistics for England and Wales reported
more than 43,000 contacts with Respect's Men's Advice Line during the year
ending March 2025. This does not establish prevalence by itself, but it
demonstrates meaningful demand for male-specific domestic-abuse support.
British sexual-offence law
also offers comparative insight. Under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, rape
remains perpetrator-specific because penile penetration is required, but the
victim is described as “another person.” A man can therefore legally be a rape
victim when subjected to penile penetration without consent. Other offences,
including assault by penetration and sexual assault, are also structured around
the absence of consent rather than a female-only victim category.
The UK approach is therefore
not completely gender-neutral in every respect, but it illustrates a broader
victim-inclusive framework than India's adult rape law.
COMPARATIVE LESSONS FOR INDIA
The comparison between
India, the USA, and UK demonstrates that there is no necessary contradiction
between acknowledging violence against women and protecting male victims.
India tends to place gender
specificity within the substantive definition of rights and offences. The
United States more frequently combines women-centred policy origins with non-discriminatory
service eligibility. The United Kingdom combines gender-neutral domestic-abuse
law with gender-responsive policy.
The most suitable Indian
model may therefore involve three layers.
The first should consist of universal
legal protection against core harms such as serious domestic abuse, sexual
assault, coercive control, stalking, and non-consensual penetration.
The second should provide special
measures based upon demonstrated vulnerability. Women facing dowry-related
abuse, reproductive coercion, pregnancy-related vulnerability, economic
dependency, honour-based violence, or particular risks of sexual violence may
legitimately receive targeted protection.
The third should create specialised
services for under-recognised victims, including men and transgender
persons, where social stigma inhibits reporting.
This model does not require
India to choose between women's rights and men's rights. It treats protection
from violence as a human-rights question while retaining substantive equality.
RECOMMENDATIONS
India should consider a
comprehensive review of domestic and sexual-violence legislation from the
perspective of inclusive victim protection.
First, the definition of an
aggrieved person under domestic-violence law should be reconsidered. Core
remedies such as protection orders, emergency restraining measures,
counselling, and relief against coercive control could be made available
irrespective of gender.
Second, expansion of
eligibility should not reduce resources for women. Women-specific shelters and
programmes should remain available where safety, privacy, or empirical need
justifies them. Comparable services can be developed for male and gender-diverse
victims.
Third, Parliament should
address the post-BNS gap concerning non-consensual penetrative sexual acts
against adult men and transgender persons. Rather than restoring the outdated
morality-based formulation of old Section 377, India should enact a modern consent-based
offence protecting all adult victims.
Fourth, sexual-offence
legislation should progressively distinguish between the gender prevalence
of an offence and the legal definition of a victim. Women can remain
recognised as disproportionately vulnerable without making other victims
legally invisible.
Fifth, India should
establish systematic national data collection concerning intimate partner
violence experienced by men. Comparable methodologies should examine physical,
sexual, psychological, economic, and technological abuse across genders.
Sixth, police personnel,
judicial officers, counsellors, medical professionals, and protection-service
providers should receive training concerning male and LGBTQ+ victimisation
alongside continued gender-sensitisation concerning violence against women.
Seventh, gender-neutral
reform should be accompanied by strong due-process safeguards. Complaints
should be investigated on evidence rather than assumptions based upon either
the complainant's or accused person's gender.
Eighth, public awareness
campaigns should challenge the notion that experiencing abuse is inconsistent
with masculinity. A man seeking protection should not be treated as weak,
humorous, or inherently unbelievable.
Finally, legal reform should
adopt a victim-centred definition of violence focusing upon conduct,
coercion, absence of consent, abuse of power, and harm.
CONCLUSION
The struggle for gender
justice in India has historically and correctly concentrated upon women because
women have experienced systematic discrimination and disproportionate levels of
domestic and sexual violence. Women-specific legislation helped transform
domestic abuse from a private matter into a question of constitutional rights
and public accountability. These achievements remain indispensable.
However, gender justice
cannot remain conceptually frozen at the stage at which legal reform first
emerged. Contemporary constitutionalism recognises dignity, autonomy, privacy,
gender identity, and bodily integrity as rights belonging to individuals. These
values require the legal system to consider victims who fall outside
conventional gender narratives.
Male victims of domestic and
sexual violence remain insufficiently recognised within Indian specialised
legislation. The Domestic Violence Act reserves the status of aggrieved person
for women, while Section 63 BNS defines rape through a female victim. The
removal of Section 377 without an equivalent consent-based provision has
created additional concern regarding adult male and transgender victims—a
concern expressly recognised by the Parliamentary Standing Committee before
enactment of the BNS.
The solution should not be a
competition between genders. Violence against women remains a major social
problem, as national statistics unmistakably demonstrate. Recognition of male
victims should therefore supplement rather than displace women's protection.
Comparative law demonstrates
that such coexistence is possible. The United States allows male victims to
obtain services under a statutory architecture historically associated with
violence against women, while the United Kingdom applies gender-neutral domestic-abuse
legislation alongside policies acknowledging the disproportionate impact of
violence upon women.
India should consequently
adopt an approach of inclusive substantive gender justice. Such an
approach would recognise structural inequalities between genders but guarantee
basic legal remedies according to the harm experienced rather than stereotypes
concerning who is capable of becoming a victim.
The ultimate test of a
gender-just legal system is not whether it gives identical treatment in every
situation. It is whether it protects every person from violence while
responding proportionately to actual patterns of vulnerability. Women's
protection and recognition of male victims are therefore not competing
constitutional objectives. Properly designed, they are complementary
expressions of equality, dignity, and justice.
FUTURE SCOPE
The issue of male
victimisation presents substantial opportunities for future socio-legal
research in India.
The most urgent requirement
is a nationally representative empirical study. Existing scholarship on male
domestic-violence victims is too limited to support definitive prevalence
comparisons. Future surveys should examine emotional, physical, sexual, economic,
technological, and coercive forms of abuse across urban and rural populations.
Longitudinal studies should
analyse whether male victims report abuse to police, medical institutions,
family courts, counsellors, or community organisations and identify reasons for
non-reporting. Research should separately examine heterosexual, same-sex,
transgender, elderly, disabled, and economically dependent male victims.
Future scholarship should
also evaluate the operation of the BNS after 1 July 2024. Judicial decisions
and police practices concerning non-consensual sexual acts against adult male
and transgender victims require particular attention.
Comparative studies
involving the UK Domestic Abuse Act and the American VAWA system could assist
in designing an Indian framework that combines gender-neutral eligibility with
gender-responsive services.
Another emerging area
concerns technology-facilitated abuse. Intimate partners may use mobile-phone
surveillance, social-media impersonation, deepfakes, threats involving private
images, financial applications, passwords, GPS tracking, and digital communications
as instruments of coercion. Such conduct can affect victims irrespective of
gender and should be incorporated into future domestic-abuse research.
The psychological
consequences of male victimisation also require study. Researchers should
examine trauma, depression, anxiety, social isolation, workplace consequences,
parenting difficulties, and barriers to therapeutic support without assuming
that male and female victim experiences are identical.
Finally, future legal
research should move beyond the binary debate of “women-specific versus
gender-neutral law.” The more productive question is how Indian law can create gender-inclusive
rights, gender-responsive institutions, victim-sensitive procedures, and
evidence-based special measures simultaneously.
Such a framework would
strengthen rather than weaken gender justice by ensuring that the fight against
historically entrenched violence against women continues while the legal system
develops the capacity to recognise every genuine victim.
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