Detection and Mitigation Techniques against Link-Flooding Attacks in Software-Defined Networking: Coremelt, Crossfire, and Cross-Path Attacks

Authors

  • Archana Bhushan Burujwale Research Scholar, Kalinga University, Raipur, (CG) Author
  • Dr. F. Rahman Author
  • Dr. Yogesh Gurav Professor and Dean (Academics), Dr. D.Y. Patil Technical Campus, Pune, Maharashtra Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29070/dp83yb14

Keywords:

Detection, Mitigation techniques, Link-Flooding attacks, Software-Defined networking, Coremelt attacks, Crossfire attacks, Cross-Path attacks

Abstract

SDN is a flexible and programmable networking architecture that separates the control plane and data plane for centralised network administration. SDN is susceptible to sophisticated Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) assaults, notably Link-Flooding assaults, despite its benefits in network administration, traffic control, and resource allocation. Because they interrupt network availability via network architecture, common communication connections, and control-plane dependencies, Coremelt, Crossfire, and Cross-Path attacks pose security risks. A multi-strategy defence framework integrating intelligent traffic monitoring, anomaly-based detection, attack classification, adaptive routing, selective traffic filtering, and control-channel protection is proposed to address these three attack types' security issues. The proposed framework detects suspicious traffic patterns, distinguishes link-flooding attack techniques, and initiates SDN controller mitigation measures. Moreover, network topology analysis and dynamic traffic control reduce congestion and retain lawful communication. Performance evaluation includes detection accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, latency, network speed, packet loss, and controller overhead. The suggested strategy organises coordinated protection against several link-flooding risks to increase SDN infrastructure resilience, availability, and operational dependability.

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Published

2025-02-01